Ralf Ruckus Explores China's Political Left

Embark on a captivating journey with Ralf Ruckus, esteemed author and co-founder of the Gong Chao Collective, as we dissect the complex tapestry of the Chinese Left and its evolution. Ralf's insights challenge conventional perceptions, revealing a shift from revolutionary fervor to a capitalist present, and the intricate dance between grassroots activism and state politics. We navigate through the seismic ripples of the Cultural Revolution, the post-Tiananmen birth of the 'New Left', and the nuanced political battles that have forged China's unique socialist experience.

Peeling back the layers of China's tumultuous march toward modernity, we traverse through the ideological maze of the country's left-wing movements. Ralph spotlights the courageous worker strikes, the internal party struggles, and the controversial reforms under Deng Xiaoping. The conversation illuminates the misunderstood goals of these reforms and the colorful spectrum within the democracy movement. By examining the Tiananmen Square protests, we trace the seismic shift from student-led to worker-dominated resistance, setting the stage for the New Left's emergence and its complex ideological identity.

As we probe the contemporary landscape of left-wing movements in China, Ralf delves into the contemporary challenges and transformations. We scrutinize the 'common prosperity' reforms and their diverse impact on society, and explore the ongoing class struggles, feminist debates, and the precarious balancing act of critiquing China's politics while remaining vigilant against global narratives and biases. Ralph's expertise offers a treasure trove of knowledge for anyone eager to truly grasp the pulse of left-wing politics in modern China.

Transcript

C. Derick Varn: 1:36

Hello and welcome to VarmBlog. Today I am with Ralph Ruckus, author of two books on China the Communist Road to Capitalism and the Left in China a Political Cartography, the social, economic, political situation, upheaval, however you want to phrase it of the People's Republic of China. For about two decades you co-founded the Gong Chao Collective and you've been really focusing in on workers action, civil unrest, migrant movements etc. In the country for a while. Um, when people often ask me to get a kind of alternate view on china, I usually put them to swung and and uh uh gong chao. So I wanted to talk to you, though, about the chinese left.

C. Derick Varn: 2:39

There's been a lot of recuperation of the prc in the us in the last four or five years. It's actually kind of slowed down in the last year, I think for somewhat obvious reasons, as the Xi economic miracle seems to have significantly slowed. But I wanted to ask you how we define the left in China. Your book kind of looks over the last century and for a lot of people China and the left is synonymous, and I think that's almost too tautologically. In a tautological way, just if we're talking about China, we're talking about the world's left-wing government period. End of discussion. Clearly you think that's misleading? I think that's misleading, but the way left and right get used in Chinese context, both within dissident circles and also by the government, makes it kind of hard to know what we're talking about. So how do we define the left in China over the last century?

Ralf Ruckus : 3:51

Yeah, thank you. Yeah, in the book the Left in China I use a very broad historical definition and maybe later in the discussion we can get back to that. Why do we need a term like left or right? Let me stay with this. In the book I use a very broad and historical definition, so I basically refer to all concepts and practices that have criticized capitalist exploitation and inequality, as well as forms of discrimination and oppression from positions that are described or that are self-conceived or self-defined as left-wing and that may be different to other people. I include At the beginning at least, I include people and movements and actors, regardless whether in my view, they actually attack all forms of exploitation and discrimination or not.

Ralf Ruckus : 4:48

That's my starting point. I don't want to exclude lots of people from the discussion at the beginning and then only talk about whatever the pure radical left or something. But when we speak about the left in China as a development in the 20s because you go back a little earlier the book covers the development after 49. So let's say in the 20s, of course, when the Communist Party was founded, I'd say that the CCP, the Communist Party of China, was involved in grassroots organizing and social struggles at that beginning and controlled somehow, the revolutionary attempt to overthrow the feudal capitalist regime. That's before 49. But that in my view changed after 49 when the CCP became an authoritarian socialist regime. So I still call it left wing, using that broad concept. I described earlier the capitalist reforms starting in 78 and the transition that took China into capitalism in the late 90s. In my view the CCP regime again changed its nature and in my view, actually stopped being a left-wing force altogether and became a capitalist force.

Ralf Ruckus : 6:16

But you know the book stars, you know the narrative of book stars in 49, and I focus mostly on the oppositional left and that is movements and groups that oppose the Communist Party regime and had left-wing practices and demands.

Ralf Ruckus : 6:34

You know there are obviously also other forces, but I focus on the opposition left-wing forces and especially I focus on a dialectic. I look at social struggles from below you know the strikes or other popular movements that had left-wing demands and then I look at left-wing groups and movements that were inspired by these social struggles and so that's the dialectic I look at in this newer book that were inspired by these social struggles and so that's the dialectic I look at in this newer book, in the earlier book that we already discussed a while ago, I look at the dialectic between struggles and containment measures or countermeasures by the regime. So this is two different perspectives here. And then, when we look at the opposition forces now and how they changed. So from the 50s until today, I think in each phase that I describe in the book they went through, there were different actors, there were different demands and obviously the situation changed because China went through socialism, through a transition to capitalism, and if you want, we can go deeper into this in the discussion.

C. Derick Varn: 7:50

Yeah, I think we probably will need to go deeper into this. I do think the left and China seems hard to get a grip on because there's both oppositional tendencies within the CCP and outside of it and that makes it a little more difficult to catalog. Where do you see, as like, for example, in 49,? What do you see as the first primary oppositional group to the CPC?

Ralf Ruckus : 8:41

Well, you know, there were strikes basically from the very beginning, right. There was a first strike wave already in 49 and then a larger one in the mid-50s. We have to see that socialism wasn't constructed within a few weeks, so it took them a few years to set up plant economy, all the institutions needed for that, and then nationalized industries. So all this was only accomplished around 1955, and then there was a massive strike wave. And I think this strike wave actually shows the contradictions of Chinese socialism at the time, because workers had obviously hoped for not just workers, also women, other groups. But now let's focus on the workers. The workers had hoped that the takeover of power by the Communist Party would mean that they are in charge right, that the takeover of power by the Communist Party would mean that they are in charge right, that they themselves are the so-called masters of the factories, as they were promised. But then they realized they were not, and I think especially there were new inequalities, right.

Ralf Ruckus : 9:54

So the first wave, and actually the second wave during the Cultural Revolution 10 years later too, was supported mostly by unprivileged, discriminated workers, like workers who didn't get, like you know, higher wages, better conditions, but felt that actually not much had changed and there was obviously a part of the working class that got good conditions, you know the so-called iron rice bowl, as it was later called, but that that wasn't all workers like.

Ralf Ruckus : 10:26

It was only a part and a smaller part of the urban workers and a large part, you know, didn't get these like the full, the full set of welfare measures, better wages but low but low wages, unstable working conditions. They were still migrants, like people who came from the countryside to the cities but only temporarily, and then were kicked out. Young workers had problems because, you know, they had very low wages, the housing situation was really bad. So there were workers sensed not only that things were not getting better but they also sensed there was a new inequality and discrimination and some privileged workers. So they got angry and they basically demand that the promise gets fulfilled. And that basically was the motivation both between the strike wave in 1955 and also a large part of the rebel movement, the rebel workers' movement, in 1966-67.

C. Derick Varn: 11:29

So how did the regime react to this first wave of strikes? And when we see, like later, things like the, the, the hundred flowers period or whatever, how, how did this kind of get either, you know, repressed or recuperated? All of the above, like, how did the regime actually handle these strikes in the mid-1950s?

Ralf Ruckus : 12:08

Well, on one hand, you know, of course there's very legitimate demands, you know like from the worker's side and it put like the regime's legitimacy. You know it challenged the regime's legitimacy. So there was no way to just like fully repress it and then that's it. You know, so, at the beginning they also they were nervous at the time, especially in 1956. The strike wave took, like you know, went on over the course of 55, 56. So in 56 there were also the workers' uprising in Poland and in Hungary. So the regime was, and workers in China also referred to that. So the regime got nervous about this and so they made some concessions but in general, you know, they answered with repression. Like the union especially was changed. Like the union that you know had some, you know was based on grassroots organizing, was later, you know, put on tighter leash and basically became like sort of just a mass organization of the party, of the party you mentioned the Hundred Flowers Movement.

Ralf Ruckus : 13:28

One thing the regime did was allowing criticism. For a while the center was not the workplaces, it was more like professionals, like intellectuals, other people who had criticized the regime. So the regime allowed criticism basically to let off steam, like you know. Also to understand, you know what's going on, why are people so discontented? And partly that also happened in the factories, but they weren't the center.

Ralf Ruckus : 13:55

And then the regime understood or learned that there was a lot of criticism and this was partly left wing it was also right wing, of course, but then they started a campaign, the anti-rightist campaign, and basically cracked down on everyone who was involved in this, in this movement expressing critique. And also they cracked down on worker activists and left-wing activists who had participated by, you know, in the strike organizing and you know they were like, rusticated, sent to the countryside or punished in other ways. So there was a reaction. But I you know, maybe you're into that, I think it's important. You know the regime also, like in later periods, it learned that only repression is not the way to actually deal with these oppositional movements or social movements from below. Repression was definitely a central part, but they also used other forms like concessions or co-optation of certain demands.

C. Derick Varn: 15:04

Yeah, you know, this builds up to a period that I find actually fairly confusing politically in China. Um, for me, the the paradox of the late of, like, say, 1965 through, uh, definitely in 1968, um through 1978, is is hard to kind of wrap my hand around, cause, on one one hand, you have seemingly left figures emerging within the cpc, uh, you have fairly radical experiments, particularly in the countryside, during the cultural revolution. Um, you have attempts to actually even get rid of, like currency, I mean, you know, stuff that the ussr never really even tried. But at the same time, you have an international policy largely responding to the Sino-Soviet split and the second round of revisionist controversies, so-called and I definitely call them so-called because they have nothing to do with the first revisionist controversies at all, but you have this to do with the first provisionist controversies at all. Um, but you have this, uh, you have the, the regime under Mao, I mean.

C. Derick Varn: 16:27

So we can't blame this on Dengism, starting to to side with capitalist factors, or are some would even say, quasi-fascist or definitely nationalist, authoritarian factors against other communist ones, I mean, justified by, sometimes by the three world theory and sometimes just by by, uh, china's foreign policy goals. And it's hard to reconcile an, you know, increasing attempts to maybe co-opt, recuperate or even sincerely engage in left-wing experiments within China, while watching China increasingly move towards orbits that were fighting communists and whatnot in other places in the world. It makes this period of Chinese development like very hard for Westerners, I think, to completely understand, because on one hand, you have China beginning to side in the side of Soviet split, with some pretty objective reactionary forces abroad, and on the other hand, you have clear, you know, radical experimentation, at least in parts of China, allowed for a little while during the Cultural Revolution. How do we make sense of that? And which lefts are coming, you know, and I think we have to talk about lefts plural in this time period in particular, which lefts are emerging in this time period?

Ralf Ruckus : 17:55

Yeah, that's a good point are emerging in this time period. Yeah, that's a good point. I think that you know. Just to start, I think that you know, the support of certain, like you know, right-wing or other regimes, like capitalist regimes, in a geopolitical confrontation against, you know, in the context of a geopolitical confrontation, in that case between China and the Soviet Union, you know, shows that how difficult and how contradictory these kind of politics are in general, right, and I think we get back to that later, like when we talk about today and the support of the CCP by certain left-wing forces, again in a geopolitical confrontation, in this case with the US. But I think we cannot understand that if we don't look at what these left-wing forces in the party, what role they had actually at the time within China and you know what you're referring to is basically the so-called ultra-left faction in the leadership of the Communist Party after 1960 or starting 1968, basically 67, 68. And I think that it's important to point out that, first of all, they were never in control of the leadership, right, so there was always, like until 76, when they were basically purged, right. This ends in 76 when the so-called Gang of Four was purged and a lot of other ultra-left forces within the party and outside the party as well. So we're speaking about roughly eight years.

Ralf Ruckus : 19:47

There was an ongoing factional struggle between the so-called left and the so-called conservative faction on the course of the CCP, on economic policies, on, of course, also foreign policies, and it depended, you know, on the time, like sometimes this faction was stronger and then sometimes this, and also in economics, usually the conservative faction was stronger. Instead of, like you know, theoretical debates, propaganda, this kind of stuff, the left-wing faction was stronger. Mao Zedong, still the leader before you know, until he died in 76, I think, he switched back and forth right. He didn't fully support either faction and then also in the later phase, he was basically sick, he wasn't seen in public much. So he still played a role, but it's really unclear how important that role was in the final years. But you know, for a start this ultra-left faction was not in control fully, you know.

Ralf Ruckus : 21:02

The other thing I want to point out is that, you know, when you talk about left wing forces, I think the key movement or the key development was the mass movement and during the Cultural Revolution that basically when actually this ultra-left-wing faction kind of developed, and I think there we have to see that basically, that movement was crushed in 67, 68, you know, by using the army, you know, and fully with the support of Mao Zedong, and in that process they co-opted part of the leadership of that you know mass movement, the rebel movement that had taken place in the workplace as well as on the streets, you know, with youth and young workers playing a main role. And so you know, it's not that this left-wing faction, the leadership after 68 was, you know, was fully like sort of, you know, left-wing force and fully behind movements, et cetera.

Ralf Ruckus : 22:06

It had actually betrayed its own movement that had promised a second revolution, that had promised the end of, you know, the rule of the bureaucratic class, et cetera. And they basically had made a deal with, you know, with Mao of course, but also with a conservative faction around Zhou Enlai and later Deng Xiaoping, in securing the rule of the party. And so you know I'm hesitant actually to say you know, that government, you know, made all these left wing experience at the time. There were, you know, of course they tried things out. There was still a strong left wing faction surviving in workplaces, etc. The main policies were designed in Beijing by a regime where the left-wing forces basically had formed a kind of coalition with the conservative faction. So I'm kind of critical of this faction. But basically, the left-wing leaders, they allowed and supported the persecution and punishment of millions of workers and youth. They were part of the rebel movement in the late 60s.

C. Derick Varn: 23:50

And so yeah, so that's why I'm very critical of them. Hmm, what can we? Um, maybe we can go into some of the specifics of these coalitions and leaders, like who do we see as in this, um, in this time period, as part of the left-wing weirdership faction? And maybe what kind of other emergent social forces do we see as acting as left-wing from like 68, 78?

Ralf Ruckus : 24:12

And in that time period, I think that, you know, basically after the Cultural Revolution, there was, you know, the hop phase, right, the mass phase of the cultural revolution that ended in 68. Just to make sure, because some people think the cultural revolution is 66 to 76, what the party calls the chaotic years. I don't agree. I think the main important phase was 66, 67, 68, and then it was basically crushed. And after, everything that came after was an attempt to actually, you know, reorganize, re-strengthen the party structures that had been basically destroyed during the mass phase and, you know, strengthen the rule of the party. And there was even, like a phase where the military played a main role in the late 60s, early 70s. So this was, you know, we kind of bear like dark times right In terms of, you know, when we look at it from a left-wing perspective. And then what we see in the early 70s, like you say, you know, there was basically, you know, overlapping developments. So, basically, inside China, we had, you know, first strikes again like movements, smaller movements that expressed, you know, discontent within the party and outside the party, within the party and outside the party. But also we had this process of, you know, like starting relations between the US government and the Chinese government. You know where the confrontation between the Soviet Union and China, which started 10 years earlier, played a major role, especially after 1969, there were actually clashes between military forces of the Soviet Union and China on the border, and so then the Chinese regime basically decided to you know, to form, you know whatever to approach the US and you know sort of enter international politics. You know like they joined, they successfully took over the place of Taiwan and the UN, but also they decided to start, like, importing technology from capitalist countries, et cetera. So I think that you know this is a very contradictory time in many ways, and I don't think that actually the left force within the party, you know what's later called the Gang of Four I think they don't, they never were fully in charge, you know. I think they opposed some of these movements or some of these developments, but they were not able to stop them and I think the pragmatic attitude of the leadership that had shown earlier too, right Sort of. You know they had economic problems. They knew that social problems, housing, wages they were also behind the struggles in the cultural revolution hadn't been solved. They knew they had to change something.

Ralf Ruckus : 27:37

I think you could say the historic meaning of the left-wing faction was that they prevented reforms as they started in 78. Because actually the reforms that were carried out after 78 by the Deng Xiaoping faction Were actually designed already in the early 70s. And Zhou Enlai played a role, Deng played a role, other people played a role, but they weren't implemented because the left-wing faction basically blocked them in a sense, and so only after Mao's death in 76. Only after Mao's death in 76. And then you know the coup, basically the arrest of the Gang of Four and the purge against left-wing forces all over China. Then they, you know, had the space and the ability the conservative faction in the party to carry out the reform. So you could say that's actually the main role, the left-wing faction in the party to carry out the reforms. So you could say that's actually the main role the left-wing faction in the party played that they blocked an earlier start of this kind of reforms.

C. Derick Varn: 28:56

So I guess this gets us to the 70s. In have the kind of In the book you describe a kind of long fading of the Cultural Revolution by the time you get to the crushing of the Second Shanghai Commune. You're really kind of done, but these experiments are still technically going on until 76. There's a lot of brinksmanship with military. Interestingly, a figure that is often considered there's a lot of brinksmanship with military, I mean interestingly, a figure that is often considered left wing in the West that I don't understand exactly why so many people consider left wing, as you know, limbaugh, and the rising form of that faction of the army.

C. Derick Varn: 29:36

The beginning of three worlds theory, which I'm not going to go into. Third world theory, um, the beginning of three worlds theory, which, uh, I'm not going to go into. Third world theory, my audience knows I've ranted about it before being recuperated in the West because it it's. It's actually recuperated wrongly, like it, in the sense that, like, um, people forget that the first world wasn't like Europe and the United States, it was the United States and the Soviet Union. It's actually a very strange theory that has been kind of rewritten in historical memory. But during this time period we start seeing that problems really emerge in kind of a new rebel period Maybe that's the wrong word for it, that problems really emerge in kind of a new rebel period maybe that's the wrong word for it around, say, 1976, right, with the April 5th movement. So can we talk a little bit about the April 5th?

Ralf Ruckus : 30:30

movement, yep. So yeah, I think, as I describe in the book, I think there's a new phase basically of left-wing opposition that starts there. I think again it's important especially in the movement in 1976, that it wasn't just left-wing forces but also other forces were involved. But it was definitely like an uprising that started after the death of Zhou Enlai but then involved a lot of workers who demanded, started demanding basically political changes like more participation of workers in the workplaces. So that you know, this movement, I put it, you know, I put it in one line with the Democracy, democracy movement in 78 to 80, and then also with the movement in 1989, the Tiananmen Square movement and especially the workers' part. There's sort of the workers' participation in these movements and their demand for a workers' democracy. So I think this is important because when we look at the authoritarian nature of Maoism, of Chinese socialism, and the disappointment of workers that they weren't actually in control of the workplaces and their lives, in a sense, then these movements can be seen as sort of an answer to that or like sort of coming out of this disappointment, demanding that you know, demanding a socialism that gives them, you know, more voice and more you know, a bigger role in decision-making on the level of, you know, on the neighborhood of, on the level of the workplaces and beyond. And so I think it's April 76, with these mass demonstrations, is the first time when such demands kind of were voiced by a mass movement. They were actually, you know, they were already described, formulated earlier, right Like already in 73, 74, we see, like people writing posters and demanding this within the party and outside the party, and then after Zhou Enlai's death and you know the critique of how the regime dealt with his death, then you know, this movement basically used the opportunity to demonstrate and it was crushed very fast.

Ralf Ruckus : 33:11

And again, because other people who have described these movements, this movement in 76, point out that there were a lot of people from the conservative faction, like workers from the conservative faction involved, I completely agree. I still think that it expressed this demand for some kind of workers' democracy, demand for some kind of workers' democracy. And then that was, you know, after it was crushed. Then all the changes happened. This was like early 76. So the changes, like Mao's death and then the purge against Gang of Four, and then sort of the transition and the start of the reforms that happened after that. And in 1978, there was another movement that kind of picked up these ideas and developed them further in the democracy war movement.

C. Derick Varn: 34:11

Yeah, the democracy war movement is interesting because it's really developing convergently with this fairly significant and sometimes I don't think people realize how significant a right-wing shift dung actually took, because you know, even you know, fairly died in the wool. Maoist will often complain about how far dung took the liberalization removing state subsidies for the education of girls, basically dismantling even the rudimentary socialized medical care that was was available in china. Um, uh, what else did he do? Um, um, you know, uh, privatizing things that aren't even privatized in capitalist countries in the west. I think the extent of privatization is often missed out upon and and I do think people miss how significant this was.

C. Derick Varn: 35:08

You all often hear this time period as the time period of like the great rising out of poverty for for many chinese people, but I point out that like, life expectancy for working class Chinese people actually froze from like 1976 to like the middle nineties. It was actually sort of astonishing that this is seen as the the an end to poverty, when it's like no, if you were rural and trying to think, your life stagnated dramatically during this time period. So it makes sense that the democracy wall movement developed. I think it's also and I like that you emphasize this, that a lot of these more democratic workers movements are of a mixed character because the workers are of a mixed character. Workers movements are of a mixed character because the workers are of a mixed character. So so like, if you're going to have a more democratic movement in a workers movement, you know in the in 76, it's going to be, it's probably going to tend left but there's going to be conservative factions within it.

C. Derick Varn: 36:13

I just think like that's, that shouldn't surprise us. Like, are you be used to condemn the idea that, like you, you know, we should have workers democracy because, oh, there's a few conservative workers out there like we? Of course there are. Like duh, but what happened to the democracy wall movement? Because it's kind of a very, it's also a kind of very quickly put down movement. So it's kind of a very, it's also a kind of very quickly put down movement.

Ralf Ruckus : 36:38

So yeah, well, you know it was a much longer thing than the, than the 1976 movement. Right, it could develop over roughly over the course of two years, although you know the, let's say, one year was more exciting. And then and then later, of course, the repression started, but but roughly it, you know it lasted from 78 to 80, 80. And then later, of course, the repression started, but roughly, you know it lasted from 78 to 80. And I think what's important is that in the movement you know, different from the earlier movements I described, where you know the discriminated, you know, temporary workers and migrant workers played a major role. Now, it was sort of the core of the workers, you know, in big state enterprises etc. Who took part in this. And you know democracy, the world movement is very, of course, very diverse, you know, and you have again, you have, right-wing forces that demanded, you know, some kind of like copy of the US system or something like that. But you had a lot of, you know a lot of them were workers who you know pointed to all the inequalities, you know, the authoritarian rule of the party, the corruption, you know. And equality also meant, you know that they could see that. You know the leaders, the party leaders, had a much better life, et cetera. There were a lot of issues that these people had and they. What was interesting is that they started underground presses, right, like they printed posters and made and it spread all over China. It was mostly, you know, it was more like stronger in urban centers, but it had a you know, it was huge as a you know, like opposition movement within an authoritarian regime and it did, of course, also somehow push the Deng faction right. Like you know, at that point Deng Xiaoping hadn't finally taken over control over the party. Basically Huabuofeng, like another faction, was basically still in power and only after you know them, using sort of the you know, the sympathies of the movements from below, the pressure from below, the Deng faction could start with the reforms. So they basically used or co-opted in some way, the content, the demands of this movement again, the demands of this movement again. But then they repressed it, you know, in 1979, 80, again arresting many of them, purging them, punishing them.

Ralf Ruckus : 39:33

And I think that what you said earlier, like you know, about the early reforms, you know, at the time, I think, neither the people involved in that movement nor anyone else outside like sort of left wing observers in other countries could immediately understand the extent and the depth of these reforms. I think it took some time and I think also it's misleading to think that they actually wanted to introduce a capitalist system and get away from this planned economy. I think they wanted to repair it, they wanted to strengthen it, they wanted to use more markets, they wanted to allow more private enterprises, they wanted to. They basically kept like rural land was still state-owned, but they basically divided plots and gave it to families, dissolved the communes and thought that through that, you know, this sort of family farming would be more productive, which it was actually in the beginning. But I don't think they ever at that point. You know, I don't think the party leadership actually planned out like that. They will know, whatever transition to to capitalism, I think that decision was made in after the movement in 89, like in the early 90s or mid 90s. But but you know for sure the, the, the effects in the uh, late 70s were were dramatic. Um, in the late 70s were dramatic.

Ralf Ruckus : 41:22

One last thing on this, because I really like this point, let me point out this point with the poverty and how the poverty was really abolished. I think we have to always see that it's not the regime that abolishes poverty, it's people working hard. And you know, and it's like on the backs of people, that economic development was organized and that it was like that in the late 70s, 80s. And it was again like that in the 90s, 2000s, with you know, sort of the you know, work market factories moving to China and the wholes 2000s, with the work market factories moving to China and the whole rise. It's not that the regime can claim, hey, we're all in poverty. People had to work hard and many people were injured, died, overworked and suffered, got low pay. I think this is important to point out.

C. Derick Varn: 42:21

I would agree with you that Deng was not trying to restore capitalism. If anything, he seems to have been just sort of a Bukharanist during this time period, but I do think we have to look at how deep these liberalization reforms went. I also think it's interesting that you point out that dung actually was legitimately more popular with some of the more uh on the street factions. Against this interest faction or the whatever affection, what you know, the, the kind of uh hand-picked successor group by mal, neither the rightist nor the leftist, but they kind of didn't believe in anything um, um, but it's actually. You know, your book points out how quickly the dung faction like does major constitutional changes, such as you know, uh, as as when everyone talks about, like oh, you know, the political liberalization brought by dung and I'm like, yeah, so the guy who abolished formal freedom of speech in china, like um, you know uh, you know the the four big freedoms, he got rid of them.

C. Derick Varn: 43:25

Um, you know, uh, you know the the four big freedoms, he got rid of them. That's speaking out against the government, having public debates, writing uh character posters and having meetings. Like um, you know. He also bans what like um all unofficial state journals from being sold really tightens up controls of the press, I mean, and that your book implies that this is partly because they're fearing what's happening in Poland when Solidarity is developing in the early 80s. They don't want to deal with that in the CPC. But also it does seem like a lot of people on the ground felt bait and switch by Dung pretty quickly, right? Am I misinterpreting this?

Ralf Ruckus : 44:14

I think, you know, on one hand, people want to change, right, like people were desperate for change in many ways, and then of course they weren't desperate for the change that actually happened then. But they wanted change and Deng basically promised change and there was no other force visible that would have brought that force, because the other factions in the party leadership basically wanted to of the course of the earlier periods, and I think that for that reason, you know, people actually had hoped for, you know, economic improvements, but also in the long term, for, you know, some kind of political liberalization or whatever you know, and you know I don't think that was very concrete at the time, but definitely there was hope. On the other hand, you know why why did um, the dank faction, you know, abolish these, these rights and also the right to strike, by the way?

C. Derick Varn: 45:18

of course I think.

Ralf Ruckus : 45:20

I think it's and this is is actually connected to later periods. I think you know the main reason is the trauma of, you know, sort of the party elite after the Cultural Revolution. So you know they were at the brink, you know, of losing power, losing control, let's say, first of all, and possibly losing power in 67. So you know, the party was dissolved, a lot of leaders had to step down. You know there were mass demonstrations, you know like millions and millions of people involved huge radical organizations demanding basically the second revolution, you know, taking down the party bureaucracy, et cetera.

Ralf Ruckus : 46:06

So and you know, dan and other people, you know this is just like whatever 10, 15 years later.

Ralf Ruckus : 46:14

They all experienced that and you know they were themselves purged, they were themselves threatened and all leaderships after that actually had the same trauma.

Ralf Ruckus : 46:26

And so I think this fear of like mass insurrection from below, you know, is very present and it was at the time and still it is in some ways.

Ralf Ruckus : 46:37

So that, I think, explains why the party you know, basically, you know, turned to like more authoritarian measures again and has continued to do so in some way. I mean, of course there were mass movements after that and sort of openings periods of you know where there was more space, but still, I think, you know, I think only after Xi Jinping, like sort of the next generation Xi Jinping is still, you know, he was also in the countryside etc. So you know, it's like being a boy, like a son of an elite leader then, you know, then being sent to the countryside. So I think he still has that trauma and maybe the next generation of leaders, whenever that will be, will not have. So I think that plays a major role in the 1970s and 80s and I think it's also had to do with the fact that they wanted to secure the party rule, and for that they had to improve the economic situation. And this was the course they chose. The course they chose.

C. Derick Varn: 48:03

Well, I guess that brings us to Tiananmen Square, which I increasingly see, even in the Western left, as portrayed as largely a reactionary movement. I've had guests on my show who have said that they thought it was mostly inspired by foreign activists, which of course they would right. But I want to talk about 10 minutes because I do think a lot of these democracy movements. It was a mixed movement. There was both very left wing and pretty right wing elements of it, but it was serious. I mean, personally, I'm of the age where my first memory of anything that I recognize from China was actually from Tiananmen Square, like it's. I remember this happening. So can you give me the context? You know how the people who participated in Tiananmen Square saw what they were doing and what kind of factions were involved. And you know, and what I think we kind of know, the the end of the government response. I think everybody kind of knows that. But what was the beginnings of the government response?

Ralf Ruckus : 49:17

Yeah.

Ralf Ruckus : 49:18

You know, I think that what's important is that basically the, the people who started it, were students, and students at that time were a very small group and mostly, you know, they came from the leading you know like from the elite right.

Ralf Ruckus : 49:37

So they were basically literally the children of the party leaders, you could say, and you know military leaders and economic leaders at the time, all linked to the party, of course. And I think that that's important right Also to understand sort of this mixed composition of the movement that it started off. In the beginning it was basically a movement of these students and they had another like an earlier movement in the mid-80s, so it wasn't like the first sort of outbreak, sudden outbreak, and I think the you know why were they so angry and why did they oppose the regime or challenge the regime? And I think this is linked to basically the fact that the regime or challenge the regime and I think this is linked to basically the fact that the regime or the you know the sort of the upper class, the ruling class, had changed throughout the eighties and became more and more corrupt and and so the you know sort of the feeling of injustice is a feeling of of you know being being governed by by a group of thieves was very present. There was also fear of a kind of crisis. Inflation had increased due to reform. So even in the sort of urban middle class or ruling class there was a lot of dissatisfaction. And then, of course, on the other hand, we see this as part of a larger development worldwide. We had the changes in the Soviet Union. Everything was in flow at that time. The actually existing socialisms all over were questioned and, of course, a lot of them collapsed soon afterwards.

Ralf Ruckus : 51:33

So I think that's the context and the students actually had, you know, in general they had more. First of all, they wanted to talk to the regime right. Basically, they wanted to negotiate a transition to what they called a more democratic system, and definitely they referred directly to Western concepts or US concepts in their movement. Still, it was impressive how many people you know were involved. It was, again, you know, centered in urban areas. Many said it's not just Beijing. Again, you know, millions of people involved. But I think that's only the beginning and that's also, you know, when people now refer to it as being right-wing or whatever. You know they both basically, when they refer to that part. Yeah, you know, I wouldn't call them outright right-wing, but definitely they were more like sort of pro-capitalist in some sense or pro-western democracy.

Ralf Ruckus : 52:38

Um, but then you know, there there was a change and I think that had had to do with the support of well, first of all there was a crackdown, a kind of limited crackdown on the students, and the student movement kind of lost impetus. But at that point and this shows the discontent of many people in China, you know also the urban working class a lot of people got involved. A lot of workers got involved, other you know urban groups in the second phase of the movement and basically in that phase they took the lead, you know. So workers would organize in Beijing, they would organize on Tiananmen Square, you know, have meetings there, discussions. People from different workplaces would come there. They would form unions and, like you know, autonomous unions. So you have this second phase where you know, again, similar to the Democracy Evolved Movement and their discussions. Then they demanded, you know, control of workers over workplaces. So it was more for like a workers' democracy. And then I think that actually also explains the crackdown.

Ralf Ruckus : 53:56

Without their involvement maybe we wouldn't have seen such a massive military attack at all. But when the workers get involved also on a larger scale. The regime didn't face basically, their children, their students that were behaving really badly and challenging but were still willing to negotiate. Suddenly they faced these big demonstrations of workers and other urban supporters, and that's, I think, when the regime decided to use the army.

Ralf Ruckus : 54:40

When they used the army, of course they were massive. That's often forgotten, right, it wasn't like there's just the army coming and killing lots of people. It was people who resisted and it also happened in different ways. So the first attempt of using the army and occupying Occupying basically Beijing was basically prevented by, you know, like a million Beijing people going onto the street and standing in front of tanks and military troops and telling them to turn back, and they did. And only the second attempt, then, on June 4th, they broke through because then the army had decided to shoot. And I think this is important. You know that when people talk about Tiananmen, it's often forgotten that a large part of this second phase of the movement was supported by workers and also the resistance against the army was in large part supported by workers.

C. Derick Varn: 55:51

So this leads us to the 90s and what confusingly and I say confusingly because New Left means like 85 different things gets labeled the New Left in China, which is often confused with the New Left inspired by China and France and the United States in the 70s. But how do we define the new left? What do we see it emerging out of the post-Dong period, you know, under Ximen and Hu Jintao, and you know it seems hard what the new left is in China, if it's ever get talked about. Sometimes it's presented as now is almost entirely, also actually secretly right-wing. Other times it's seen as Western identitarian influenced. Other times it's it's portrayed, as you know, neo-maoist. Your book kind of indicates that to some degree all these things are true. So how do we break down the development of the New Left in China from the 1990s?

Ralf Ruckus : 56:56

forward. Well, first of all, you know the New Left. First of all, those involved never not really use that term themselves, so it's a description from the outside. And then there were never like a unified group, you know. So that's why you have, like, all these different, you know people with different perspectives involved there. But I think that why we talk about a so-called new left in China. I think that's basically 90s, right? So in the 90s you had basically two developments On one hand you had the capitalist restructuring of the enterprises in China and then the massive movement of workers, you know, sort of the old socialist working class, so to speak, against this restructuring, and that was picked up by, you know, by left-leaning intellectuals.

Ralf Ruckus : 57:56

And the other part is that you had the critique of neoliberalism, which is not, you know, not just in China but you know, also elsewhere. So within China also, people picked that up and, like intellectuals, picked that up, that critique, and formulated a critique of neoliberalist policies within China and outside China. At the same time also, they took up like sort of the nostalgia for egalitarian ideas, or you know what I call mystifications of the socialist period, right? So there was a revival of Mao and references to Mao in the 90s as well. So basically the new left kind of combined these different parts, you know, like sort of references to Maoist egalitarianism, critique of neoliberalism, and then a critique of the capitalist, restructuring and the support of the movements of the old socialist working class. So all this kind of like is part of the discourse and pushed, you know, the formation of whatever intellectual circles or debates. I wouldn't even say it's a circle, I think it was. We talk about debates, right, and people sort of referring to each other and supporting each other or criticizing each other. And also the new left is kind of you know, it has to also be always be understood as a sort of you know, one part of the coin and the other part of the coin is a liberal. So at the same time as having a sort of new left debate, you had a sort of liberal liberal in the sense of you know more like sort of pro, pro Western democracy or pro capitalist in a sense group and interesting enough, you know basically the proponents of both groups. They came out of debates in the 80s and also throughout like 1989 and the movements there, you know, are the same groups of them and they knew each other personally and even some of the new left people had been more liberal in the 80s and then changed positions. So it's basically also kind of a you know, a certain intellectual sort of generation. You could say that formed both the new left and the liberals. Sorry, the liberals say that formed both the New Left and the Liberals.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:00:28

And now the change you know you asked about. I think that's very important For me. The discussion of the New Left makes sense for the 90s and early 2000s, you know. Then you had this discussion on these positions. Everything else that came later, I think, is even more blurred and unconcrete. And you know part of the people you know that are counted as New Left moved closer to the party. Some supported a faction, a party faction behind a CCP leader called Bo Xilai in the late 90s, late 2000s, early 2010s, and then he was purged, you know, because he was a competitor of Xi Jinping for party leadership, basically. And then also some of the new left started supporting sort of you know, the CCP, even Xi Jinping. They took on like more like nationalist Chinese positions, you know.

C. Derick Varn: 1:01:33

So I think that it kind of decomposed in a sense, in a way that because because I don't see like a you know, sort of um, what you couldn't call, it still call like a left new left discourse and now like coming from that intellectual scene well, yeah, one of the things I've noticed, um, I was in uh uh the republic of korea during the boshilai uh xi jinping standoff where standoff where they got him for what was probably real corruption, but the kind of real corruption you would probably find on any major Chinese official, to be frank. And then what was interesting about Xi is you have both this distancing from this kind of neo-Maoist faction, but also I did see an immediate recuperation and you started seeing, even in things clearly geared by Chinese students towards the West, like I don't know, the Cao Collective or whatever stuff like that, talking this kind of neo-Maoist language but clearly being this kind of neo-Maoist language but clearly being center or even kind of right-wing nationalist. I started hearing them appropriating, even in Maoist form, like mixing Mao language with the whole thousand years of Confucianism necessary for communism rhetoric which, while some Westerners seem to somehow believe, I'm like how do you know anything about Chinese history and think that that makes any kind of sense? The Confucians were usually the people that the Chinese were fighting. The Chinese leftist and communist and even the PRC were fighting the hardest. So it's a very interesting sort of recuperation. But I also got the feeling that other elements of this kind of quote, like neo-Maoist movement became something else too. Some got more involved with the workers. Um, it also seems like there were some reforms to policies in the countryside, that kind of dampened down on some of the civil unrest in the rural areas, but that also seems to have kind of stalled. I mean, this is and this is me like noticing trends that I would get in news in Asia about, like where there was tensions and where they would come up and then how they'd come up now, sometimes around the banking sector, sometimes around, you know, opposition to uh to uh contemporary policies. So I guess this leads me to two questions and we can kind of get to where things are today with the left in China.

C. Derick Varn: 1:04:37

There's been a lot of discourse, even in the quote Western left, by kind of neo-Maoist asterisk, as a person who in the quote western left by by kind of neo Maoist asterisk, as a person who remembers what Maoism meant in the west in the 80s and 90s, where they hated the currently existing people's republic. Some of those same groups now being like Gist and Dungus confuse the shit out of me. But whatever, we're not talking about the west, they're just something to note, same groups now being like Gist and Dungist confuse the shit out of me. But whatever, we're not talking about the West, they're just something to note. There has been a lot of discussion of white leftists and Western leftists and a lot of this discourse has also been from China, has been reincorporated in English into anti-revisionist and anti-imperialist language about Western left and white left, sometimes weirdly cleaned up through either Australian or Italian theoreticians Don't know why that is, but nonetheless it is the case.

C. Derick Varn: 1:05:49

What are we to make of this call? I mean, like you know, I've heard you say before that to speak of a Western left in this way actually tends to favor maybe even right wing factions in the Chinese Communist Party today, and it's a way to kind of artificially unify the ideology both within China and within the Communist Party against some kind of nebulous liberal Western namby-pamby. You know left. That probably isn't all that well. And also, can we even speak of neo-Maoism anymore? Is that like, since it seems to have kind of split in many directions? I think you've already indicated this, but to go into that a little bit, is that even a meaningful phrase for contemporary social movements in China?

Ralf Ruckus : 1:06:44

phrase for contemporary social movements in China. Well, in terms of like, what's the main sort of ideological or political influence? I would say yes, of course, maoism is still, you know, very present in debates among young activists or young intellectuals who, you know, critically analyze the state of Chinese capitalism. I think you know they're very different, you know it's very diverse, you know, so it's very hard to actually discuss it. Also, I have, you know, I've talked to people who would self-identify as neo-Maoist, but we wouldn't have many disagreements on the situation in China or the way to support the workers, why, you know also, you know, they're neo-Maoist, so clearly supporting the CCP and support nationalist positions. So I think, you know it's very difficult. I think that you think that it's important to note that we still have these groups in China, in circles, some of them referring to neo-Maoism, some not, who have been partly involved in workers' struggles and in feminist struggles and discourses. They all experienced a crackdown and basically it culminated in 2018. So since then, they basically had to kind of act on the surface, be more careful of how they publicly express themselves, but they still continue to exist and they're still active. It's hard for us to actually, you know, like for me or others to. You know we cannot point them out, we cannot, like, you know, we cannot refer to them openly because it's so sensitive the whole issue of discussing what we discuss here, because it's so sensitive the whole issue of discussing what we discuss here. But definitely they exist.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:08:46

I want to go like comment on this Western leftism, white left accusation a little bit, because I think that you know we have to be careful a little bit, because I think there is a good reason to question left-wing positions on the base of their original positioning in general. Right, this is not just about China. You know, we could talk about Ukraine or Taiwan or other places as well. I think that you know it's important, like, if I formulate a critique or you are someone else, you know where are we from, what's our perspective? Are we involved in the discussions on the ground in that area or not? Or how are we involved? And it's justified to criticize the left-wing positions on China or the CCP from outside, especially if they're not based on, like, proper research or engagement or involvement, you know, in social and left-wing movements in China. And you know I've seen critique of certain positions on China or in China where I thought, hey, come on, shut up, you don't know what you're talking about. You know because you haven't looked at it deep like you don't know what you're talking about, you know, and because you haven't looked at it deep enough or you haven't been there, you haven't discussed that with people. So you know, as a start, I think that's justified.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:10:14

About Western leftism of course I'm. You know this is the term left, western, you know that's used often in China is very annoying in a way for me, because you know it gives the impression that you know there's China, whatever, and the left in China, and then there's the left in the west. But what is the west and what about? You know what about left-wing positions in circles around the world, in the global south? This is often completely ignored in the debate we're not discussing, just like in China and outside China. We have to talk more in general about different positions worldwide, and then that gets very diverse and very complex, obviously, but it's necessary to not ignore left-wing debates on China and, you know, on other topics that are not from the West.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:11:09

And then you're right, of course, in China, you know this accusation of you know whatever people accusing Western leftism or white left, of course that's you. That's very similar to the campaign that CCP uses in general against so-called hostile foreign forces and everyone who colludes or allegedly colludes with such hostile foreign forces. So I think we have to be careful how this critique is actually used from within China and it's often used just to defend the CCP, to defend certain capitalist relations there, to attack any opposition, also left-wing opposition within China, and discredit it. So it's used in that way left-wing opposition within China and discredit it.

C. Derick Varn: 1:12:09

So it's used in that way, and that's my second point on that. Well, yeah, I think that's a fair point. I often find myself furious with both criticisms and defenses of China, because they just seem to come out of nowhere. I mean, uh like they either take statements by the Chinese government completely at face value, with no critical apparatus whatsoever, are they just also assume that? You know, uh, statements by Western governments who are clearly have agendas, uh are, are just straightforward, true, and you know um, for a situation I don't want to go deeply into, but like the situation with the uyghurs, for example, uh, um, that's a situation where I I know enough about that to know that both what I'm hearing from the Western press and what I'm hearing from China apologists, they're like mirror images of each other that don there's reasons to be concerned, but none of them indicate anything like a quote genocide, unquote, unless you use the most broad definition given by the un, in which you know language, policies can be genocidal, etc. Um. So it does kind of put you in lurch, right? Because on one hand, I I often feel like, when I'm talking to more liberal-ish critics of China in the United States, that I feel like a China defensist, and then when I talk to anti-revisionists or people who project things upon the Chinese regime in a more leftward fashion, that I sound like an utter critic of everything from China and maybe even a Sinophobe, and it's very disorienting because I feel like I'm going from one to the other very quickly. But it comes from trying to root this in things that I know and seen, read, et cetera, and with the caveat that I also don't read Mandarin, so my knowledge base is interpreted through other people, even though I have been to China a couple times. But it does make it very difficult right now, particularly as decoupling both is and is not happening between the PRC broadly, in the United States broadly, and also the Belt and Road Initiative seems to have stalled. Now what that's led to me is I haven't heard that much about what's actually going on politically in China post-COVID, and you know, I think that's actually a very interesting place to be that, even though there's all know, there's all these mentioned, uh, mentioning of things in China and the Western press that uh, uh, we're not hearing about. You know, like the large, I mean one things we haven't talked a lot about, but in like the early 20 teens. There were huge, you know, strikes and uprisings that were not, that were informal the wildcat strikes, things like that. Uh, you know there were. There were actions and propaganda by the deed uh at Foxconn. People know about that. But um, this was actually, you know, part of the seeming recuperation of the Bushi life action.

C. Derick Varn: 1:15:58

Uh um into parts of the of the G faction seemed to be related to knowing. You had to do something about this. We've heard a little bit about some unrest uh around housing um in china today, but that seems also largely tied to criticisms of of um chinese banking policies and some and some legitimate instability there. But we're not hearing a whole lot about what's going on from the left within China anymore. I don't think I'm not seeing it. So what is happening in China right now in regards to any kind of left? It seems very hard to articulate. It seems like it exists, but what it is does not seem clear to me at all.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:16:51

Yeah, let's start with you know, with the changes, maybe because I think that you know, when you look back to the early 2010s and the strikes, and then you know the neo-Maoist groupings supporting the strikes, or you know, know there were a lot of like groups, ngos, labor NGOs supporting them. So this was a phase where you know the, basically the rise that the, the um, you know, the the growth rate was was still up, the, the wages had improved, um, especially after the crisis in 2007-2008. You know there was another push and so economically and socially, you know it was kind of like going forward. You know, and kind of left was using this impetus and this situation, and that completely changed, you know, in the last 10 years. So, you know, not just because of COVID and the pandemic, the crisis related to that, but also after you know the Chinese economy has basically stagnated in a certain sense, right, it's not it hasn't completely stagnated, but compared to the growth rates before, definitely the growth has slowed down and also the improvements for workers, right, so the wages have stagnated. It's very hard now to get a good job, like all these people went to colleges, you know you have this massification of education, right, so a lot of people went through secondary education, you know, colleges, universities, finished that you know and all with the dream to step up socially, get a good job, and this is blocked right. So you have crisis on different fronts. At the moment you even have like sort of a more general slowdown that has to do with the crisis of the real estate sector, but also with other sectors.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:18:53

So basically you would say you know what's happening now is, on one hand, you have a lot of angry young people and of course they are not left wing or whatever. They're just angry and dissatisfied and, depending on their social status, you know, some drop out because they have other resources family support, whatever and try to, you know, not get out of the red race. So you have this whole discussion on Tang Ping and like lying flat and people trying to get out of this sort of normal capitalist career life. But that's mostly middle-class people who can afford that right, people from working class or migrant working class background. They usually cannot afford that. So those young people, even though they have a college degree or higher, they go into proletarian jobs, basically and just to survive, which also means they are dissatisfied and angry.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:19:51

And you know, and part of that also, you know, feeds into sort of you know left-wing discourses on the ground.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:19:58

But you know it's very hard, as I said earlier, like if you are involved in like left-wing groups at the moment, like you cannot openly show your face or like you know you could do that 15 years ago, like you know. Like you know support a strike openly and place demands and support demands et cetera, like that, or feminist groups could act as such. You know, today it's mostly limited to what you can do on social media, which is more individualized, and you know, there you see the expression of this anger, of course, but not in an organized way, because that's kind of dangerous. You know you might get arrested, you might get fired from a job, you might get other pressures, and so that makes it so hard from outside to see. But definitely there's an expression of this anger. You also have, you know, the women's movement, still strong. Like you know, there are all these policies to kind of motivate women to have more kids and they're kind of resisting that. There's a discussion on sexualized violence and the reaction to to instance of that on the internet.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:21:23

So, there are many, not many, but there are certain, let's say, areas where you see this pressure from below, this kind of critique of the regime, the critique of the conditions which express left-wing content right, of the conditions which express left-wing content right, like feminist content or pro-worker, anti-exploitation content. But you know it's hard to. You know we don't really see sort of platforms or groups that represent those that anger and that critique openly.

C. Derick Varn: 1:22:09

So it seems like things have gone more underground. Actually, in some ways, one of the interesting things about the discourse in China is how much it does mirror the discourse in the West, even though it comes from a completely different context, and I think that's an interesting thing to look at. You know people dropping out, but that's largely a middle class phenomenon because you at least have to have wealth, if not actual income, to do that. There are generational distinctions around the amount of property value gain from the property liberalization of the 1990s, which benefited it did benefit workers, but a specific generation of them, and all that Plus you have a very aging population. That plus you have a very aging population and and you know this is not of no import but china's, you know uh growth rate is essentially the same as the west right now. Um, which you know uh for, for, yes, for the west that would be doing good, but for the last 40 years in china that's actually really, really low.

C. Derick Varn: 1:23:24

Um, I remember back when western pundits were always saying, when china's growth rate dropped below 10 a year, there's the, the, the, the, the, the cpc is going to be, uh, overthrown, and I I remember finding that funny even then, but you know clearly that's happening. But we do see real stagnation and there doesn't seem to be an easy way out this time. There's not a whole lot of easy production left for China to just scoop up and do. Friendshoring and multipolarityarity, as it's often thrown around and in certain internet circles, uh, uh has actually not been as friendly to china as people would have thought it might be. Um, uh, you know um and that to me it has left a lot of the, the, the western for lack of a better term European and American left, canadian left as well kind of unable to know what to do with the situation in China.

C. Derick Varn: 1:24:34

I mean, I just feel like you know, even even as little as a year, two years ago, everybody was like daddy G, come save us. And you know China's going to lead the way into the future and you see less and less and less of that explicitly today, at least in circles that I move in, and I think that has to do with the economic cooldown and with the general sense of malaise. I do want to ask you one question, though In the last two years there not a lot, but definitely some Some regulations of the market, some stabilization of banking, etc. How has this so-called Red New Deal, which again already seems to be fading into the memory of the discourse very quickly, but was definitely spoken about in certain China-watching circles immediately after COVID? How has that kind of played out, as it seems to have largely not been as big of a reform set as previously thought?

Ralf Ruckus : 1:26:15

First of all, I don't think you know that that's really new, I mean. And also, like you know, of course, the party. You know it needs to save its legitimacy, especially in times of crisis, right, or slowdown or economic problems, which is obviously facing not just because of the pandemic but in general in the last few years, and of course, one part of that is that people, young people especially they still expect economic improvements, right, so there's kind of an understanding. Ok, you know the Communist Party is in power and it's authoritarian rule. You know we don't have much control, but at least you know, economically we we see progress, you know we see improvement and that has been basically broken. That is behind that what you said. You know this prediction of the growth rate falls below 10%. You know the CCP will have problems Behind that is this sort of social legitimacy among large parts of the population.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:27:26

And I think you know these measures you know I wouldn't use. You know these measures you know I wouldn't use. You know in China, you know sometimes they're referred to as common prosperity, which is an old term, say reforms. You know like measures to react to, you know to problems in the economy or social problems, right, and you know, part of that was, of course, you know, acting against certain private capitalists, especially in the IT industry. But they didn't dismantle that industry right, they didn't take it apart and like, broke it up and change it or whatever. They just, you know, put the leaders on a leash, you know, or threatened them. Part of that you know. Mostly it's like Keynesian kind of measures to intervene in the economy, and you know that has nothing to do with the left-wing agenda or anything like this.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:28:32

In my view, unless you want to describe measures by the US government like welfare measures also as sort of explicitly left-wing, you know, I just wouldn't do that. I think one. I want to point out one thing you know that what has actually changed when you look at that and you know, sort of in the last 20 years, like you know, and that is the support of the middle class for the regime, and I think that you know that is a major factor. Also, when we look at like other revolutionary processes in the past, you know it's not just like you know, that sort of their left wing or like whatever working class movement, social movements, challenging the regime, but at the same time we also have to look at, you know what groups support the regime right, like what are the sort of the? You know where does the Communist Party has its you know sort of its backing force, and this used to be the urban middle class that benefited largely from the reforms economically, you know, throughout the 90s and 2000s into the 2010s, and that is in danger now, right. So, in that sense, you know there might be some changes in the future and you're pointing to this housing.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:29:51

You know there might be some changes in the future and you're pointing to this housing. You know the protests around housing. I think you know that's only one symptom. I think behind that is possibly you know, I'm not saying, you know, I'm not predicting where it will end but possibly a more serious rupture between the party elite and a part, especially of the younger part of the middle class that doesn't see its own economic position improve anymore and, on the contrary, it's getting worse, you know, and the real estate crisis is a factor, but also, as I said earlier, you know the sort of the fact that it's very hard to get better jobs and also that you know it's hard to find people, young people, who want to sacrifice their life just for their career, right, so there's a general critique also of that path in life. You know sort of the capitalist career and that you know this sort of. You know if this middle-class support for the CCP is actually crumbling or will actually crumble, that's a major, major factor and you know I'm waiting, I'm wondering what we will see there in the next future.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:31:06

At the same time, you know, as I said, like there are still working class struggles. You know, if you go, you know if you check like the reports on strikes, most of them at the moment are about unpaid wages. You know sort of another symptom of the crisis that workers don't get paid, but they are still rebellious. You know it's not that everyone just accepts what's going on, but you know there are lots of strikes, of movements still coming up and I think you said, like what shall the left outside China refer to? I think you know there are a lot of these things going on, right, you can refer to these strikes and struggles. You can refer to the feminist debates and the feminist struggles which are still continuing. And also you know like there are Chinese feminists, often outside China, who have a voice, who publish on this you can refer to.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:32:14

You refer to the capitalist structures, the capitalist policies of the CCP regime. So I think there is enough we can actually refer to. I think you were just pointing to the fact some people are not willing to do that because they decide to you know, for whatever you know, because they think you know the worst enemy is US imperialism. So let's forget about all the other enemies, something like some logic like that. Or they actually personally benefit from the regime because, you know whatever, they have a teaching position in Beijing or whatever, they have a teaching position in Beijing or whatever, and then so they are actually part of, you know, these groups that support the regime because it benefits their own personal interest.

C. Derick Varn: 1:33:02

Yeah, yeah, I mean I'm not going to call out names here, but I have noticed certain groups in the United States headed by certain people who happen to have certain affiliations with Chinese universities. So you know, it's just. I don't like to be that vulgar, but you know it's definitely a thing. Yeah, and I do think I mean. One thing I will say as a person, as I was mentioning earlier, who wants to talk about this fairly.

C. Derick Varn: 1:33:36

Sometimes you do feel like you're, you are whiplashing between, uh, obvious sign of phobia that's more than just you know criticism of the, of the, of the authoritarian elements of the CPC. It might be anti-communism, it might just be anti-asian racism, etc. Um, on one hand, and then, um, blatant, uh apologia are ignoring things. They're like somehow giving the chinese communist party credit for strikes against it or stuff like that. Just bizarre uh frames of logic. Um, on the far left you encounter the latter more, but in in the general public, you encounter the former a lot more. And so it's at least here in the united states, um, where anti-chinese sentiment is rampant and bipartisan. Uh, you know just somewhat of a new development, um, even in cases where it makes very little. You know where, where, for example, um, uh, parts of the elements of the us right and far left uh want to uh take a more cleanly pro-Russia stance. Um, for variety of reasons, some legitimate, some illegitimate. Um, and we'll still try to maintain anti-Chinese, uh, you know, orientation, um, so it it does it.

C. Derick Varn: 1:35:06

I think it is particularly hard to talk about right now, not just because of what's going on in China, but also what's going on in the us and canada and europe. Um, so, um, I often tell people to get read your new book. I will say it's kind of a? Um, I mean, it's, like you know, four generations of of leftists, this from 49 to today uh, condensed into a book that's under 150 pages. So you do run pretty quickly. Um, but it's, it's a very useful book for getting a grasp on the broad scope of what you know the left in china has been and what, maybe what it will be in the future. It's hard to say right now. I mean, frankly, I kind of feel like the left everywhere is a little bit more up in the air than it was, you know, 10 years ago. But who's to say? Where can people find your work, ralph?

Ralf Ruckus : 1:36:27

Well, first of all, there's the website gongchaoorg, that you know where all the literature is linked and you find you will find this podcast, you will find other videos and you know the book is available on. It was published by Pluto Press, so you can either get published by Pluto Press so you can either get it through Pluto Press or just order it in a bookstore If you can't order it on Amazon but order it somewhere else. But if you have to, well, sometimes there's no way around. And yeah, I think that you know, because you pointed that I try to write, not, you know, for people who you know want to get all the details and get really deep into things and ideological discussions, for instance, and or just about the current situation. I try to write in a way that gives an overview of different oppositional left-wing movements in China against a Communist Party regime that has changed dramatically, you could say, over the course of that period. And still, you know there's kind of a continuity of opposition, of challenging from below, and I think that's a reference, because you know you point out that earlier. You know where should we start, you know what can we refer to. I think there are many references we can make and I also try to do that in the book. You know where the things that happened in China always were kind of connected to movements and situations outside, and you know it's interesting you say that you know when you talk to young Chinese left wing people today or activists today, of course their perspectives, the problems they have, you know, the problems they face, the challenges they face from the regime are very similar in many ways to the problems we face in other parts of the country and also what the left-wing activists discuss. This is very similar because you know, of course there are differences in the way societies and capitalisms are organized in Europe, in Eastern Europe, in Western Europe, in North America, in the global south and in different regions, but still they're also sort of combining or common mechanisms, structures that we all face, above all, of course, the organization of work, the capitalist organization of work and life, or the patriarchal system and the division of people through racism for instance, and we have to tackle all that, no matter where we are.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:39:36

And this is also, I think, maybe a last point on what you said earlier.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:39:42

You know, of course it's important, you know, to fight against sort of anti-Chinese sentiments or racist sentiments against Chinese and also to fight against sort of an anti-Chinese sentiments or racist sentiments against Chinese, and also to fight against sort of an anti-China position that's based on whatever capitalist or imperialist or nationalist interests in other areas, like other countries.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:40:06

And equally it is important to, if we talk about capitalist relations or patriarchal relations in China, to also talk about these in the areas where we live in or where we are from, and they're equally important, not from China or also as someone from China, to not exclude China and look at it equally. And in my view, if you go down and actually look at the social context, the sort of everyday experiences of workers, of women, of migrants, everyday experiences of workers, of women, of migrants, of young people in China, or also of LGBT groups, of other groups in China, then you find a lot of similarities and common struggles. And if you are from any of these groups and you are involved in your struggle in your own place, then there's a way to relate to the struggles of these people in China and there is enough material.

C. Derick Varn: 1:41:29

My book is one example, but there's also other material that you can use to understand better these common problems. One thing I would suggest with your book, which I would definitely endorse as a pretty great overview, is your bibliography is extensive. So if people want to read the stuff that you have been reading, you make it available to them, and so I would definitely use your book as a launching point. But then I, you know, definitely go learn more, um, and if you want to engage in and struggles and I do think you know anybody who's trying to be a responsible, uh, socialist or communist or anarchist or whatever you some of them are on that spectrum these days you do have to deal with China.

C. Derick Varn: 1:42:13

There's no way not to I mean, it's a major world historical force right now and to exclude it or treat it as somehow completely cordoned off or whatever. Yeah, I agree with you, you're missing out on a lot if you do that. Thank you so much for coming on and I'll link your site in the show notes and I would definitely tell people they should if they want to understand what we might call counter-systemic left-wing movements out of China after the Communist Revolution to the current. You probably have the broadest rundown. That's pretty easy to read, so thank you for that.

Ralf Ruckus : 1:43:00

Well, thank you very much for inviting me and for the very interesting discussion today.

C. Derick Varn: 1:43:06

Thank you.